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Modem Fact: Problems of Know­
ledge in the Sciences of Wealth and 
Society. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998. Pp, 419. 
Although it considers questions of 
education only in passing, Mary 
Poovey's intricate History of the 
Modem Fact willprovide historians 
of education with a good ground­
ing in recent conceptual and 
methodological developments in 
the human sciences. The book exa­
mines an "epistemological unit": 
the modern fact. Her study of 
epistemological units is intended 
to reveal the foundations of know­
ledge production practices. Poovey 
locates her book in the overlapping 
fi~lds ?f the ,Prehistory of the s.ocial sciences, intellectual history, and 
historical epistemology. She WIshes to avoid a linear account of the 
mo?ern. fact, fo.r she ~lai~s that such acco~Int~ retrospectively recodify 
their objects of mvesnganon and thereby dIsmISS much of the context in 
which developments take place. 
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.Poovey's reading of the texts that sustain her intellectual history is 
gUIded by a double concern. First, she wishes to break with the tactics of 
unmasking and denunciation that characterize much would-be critical 
history writing. Such tactics consist in demonstrating, in the wisdom of 
hindsight, that past authors employed what we know to be oppressive or 
exploitative concepts. Poovey argues, on the contrary, that authors and 
texts can't be sexist or racist, for instance, before the construction of the 
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categories of sexism and racism. 
By way of taking up the implications of this stance, Poovey seeks to 
locate authors and texts in intellectual and cultural "configurations," 
where what can be thought and known, what demands enunciation and 
what is assumed, and what forms and styles of enunciation are available, 
all have characteristic limits. Configurations, or "ensembles" are fields 
rich in possibility. Against linear readings of intellectual history, Poovey 
~vth of the volume. Specialists in 
_ profit from the book, and non­
III bow advanced the scholarship is. 
iDme myths about the Jesuits that 
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insists that there are always paths not taken in one ensemble that may 
reappear in another. Furthermore, Poovey seeks to maintain a notion of 
continuity that stretches across intellectual discontinuity by suggesting 
that subsequent readings of texts turn what were initially statements into 
questions. The modern fact is characterized by an internal tension: on 
the one hand, facts are isolated, observable particulars that are significant 
in their own right. On the other hand, facts are evidence. They acquire 
significance in relation to some overarching theoretical schema. Modern­
ist social and political thought has been characterized by a variety of 
attempts to resolve this tension, either by elevating one of its dimensions 
over the other, or by seeking strategies of knowledge production that 
circumvent it. Poovey provides us with a genealogy of such attempts. 
In broad outline, Poovey's narrative emphasizes England and locates 
the emergence of the modern fact in Baconian empiricism and in the 
double-entry bookkeeping of the 16th century. She traces the 
intellectual and political practices and devices of the 17th and 18th 
centuries that made it possible to bridge the gap between fact and theory 
without collapsing it. For instance, the authority of the absolutist state, 
the disinterested civility of gentlemen observers, and beliefs in divine 
providence and in universal human subjectivity were invoked at different 
moments to provide the framework of an overarching system that 
enabled the isolated particular to signify in its own right. Poovey then 
shows that the modern fact encountered its limits in Hume's scepticism, 
which brought the problem of induction to the fore. Having rigorously 
rejected a priori assumptions about systematic knowledge, Hume 
concluded that the only grounds one can have for assuming that future 
observations of particulars will continue to resemble past observations is 
some species of belief. 
Belief is at the heart of systematic knowledge, and thus the internal 
tension that is constitutive of the modern fact was faced with implosion. 
Although Hume himself turned to other modes of writing, such as the 
essay, as a support for claims to knowledge, Poovey argues that Smith, 
McCulloch and Malthus adopted different tactics. Smith invented a set 
of conceptual abstractions, such as the "market system," to provide an 
orderly framework for the making of observations. In his thought, in 
other words, the tension between theory and observation was resolved 
by moving towards the theoretical pole. McCulloch (Dickens's Mr. 
M'Choakumchild in Hard Times) argued for a professional solution to 
the problem of induction: "statistics" would be the province of the 
collection of neutral facts; political economy, conducted by experts, 
would be the province of general significance. And, importantly for the 
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readers of this journal, education would operate as a sort of alchemy, 
training people to act in keeping with their interests as revealed by 
political economy, and thereby bringing statistical observation into line 
with the dictates of theory. In Malthus's work the use of numbers also 
served to widen the gap between observation and belief. First, Malthus 
sought to claim that because numerical regularities could be observed in 
practice, they were not the result of deduction. Second, because 
regularities were numerical, they were not the result of interest: numbers 
were held to be transparent. 
Finally, according to Poovey, it was with William Herschel and j.S. 
Mill that English social thought took the problem of induction firmly on 
board; moved away from the ambition of a transparent replication of 
observable reality in thought; and sought instead to model the world 
hypothetically. For Mill, social science would be exact, because it would 
deal with large-scale tendencies (as revealed by the law of large 
numbers). Itwould dealwith the problem of induction by subordinating 
the isolated particular to the general tendency. With this sort of 
resolution, Poovey suggests, we depart from the modern fact towards 
some variant of a postmodern fact, whose referent is not necessarily an 
empirical entity at all. 
The development of the modern fact has been closely connected to 
practices of numerical representation and Poovey's book participates in 
the growing interest of historians in numeracy. Assigning numbers to 
isolated particulars has been one of the ways in which they have been 
inserted into more general systems of knowledge, especially in the 
sciences of wealth and society. Part of Poovey's project is to chart the 
practices whereby numerical representation came to be seen as trans­
parent and authoritative, and there are two notable analytic thrusts of the 
work in this regard. First, Poovey extends the productive distinction 
between precision and accuracy that has been established in science and 
technology studies. The concepts have commonly been equated, but the 
distinction makes it possible to show the ways in which precision, as a 
characteristic of measurement practice, has encouraged the belief that 
some representations are accurate-that they faithfully capture reality in 
thought. Poovey carries her position by pointing to the "constitutive 
fictions," such as "goodwill," which seem to make books of account 
balance, but any observer of standardized educational testingwill appre­
ciate that claims about the "accuracy effect" of precision measurement 
are not limited to commerce. Furthermore, Poovey is concerned with 
styles of argumentation, especiallywritten styles, for she claims that how 
arguments are made is constitutive of them. The authority of numbers is 
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closely connected to stylistic conventions that submerge the work 
necessary to make diverse and variable objects seem to be equivalent. 
Space precludes a discussion of the many other dimensions of this 
work that readers are likely to find interesting. Poovey's earlier book, 
Makinga Social Body, suffered from its origins as a collection of essays 
and Modern Fad shares the same difficulty, although to a lesser extent. 
There are a number of repetitive sections that testify to their origins as 
essays and the last chapter, one of the first to be written, does not satisfy 
as a conclusion. The most serious limitation of the work in my view, 
however, is methodological. Cultural ensembles or configurations of 
knowledge contain a variety of genres and styles, works well known and 
works ignored, paths followed and paths not taken. It is reasonable to 
argue, as Poovey does, that the ensemble as a whole is relevant. Yet it is 
impossible practically to reconstruct everything written and debated in 
philosophy and literature, and so Poovey tends to gesture towards paths 
not taken, towards what is "not the modern fact." Such gestures 
certainly defeat linearity, but Poovey does not explain the logic of their 
selection. I am tempted to see an irony here: the texts Poovey discusses 
are isolated particulars that serve as evidence, but part of the system 
guiding her selection of them is not enunciated. 
Bruce Curtis 
Duncombe Education Research Centre 
Carleton University 
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